9a1dc2a0a2
The security example shows that `env::current_exe` will return the
path used when the program was started. This is not really surprising
considering how hard links work: after `ln foo bar`, the two files are
_equivalent_. It is _not_ the case that `bar` is a “link” to `foo`,
nor is `foo` a link to `bar`. They are simply two names for the same
underlying data.
The security vulnerability linked to seems to be different: there an
attacker would start a SUID binary from a directory under the control
of the attacker. The binary would respawn itself by executing the
program found at `/proc/self/exe` (which the attacker can control).
This is a real problem. In my opinion, the example given here doesn’t
really show the same problem, it just shows a misunderstanding of what
hard links are.
I looked through the history a bit and found that the example was
introduced in #33526. That PR actually has two commits, and the
first (
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| .. | ||
| alloc | ||
| backtrace@b02ed04a7e | ||
| core | ||
| panic_abort | ||
| panic_unwind | ||
| portable-simd | ||
| proc_macro | ||
| profiler_builtins | ||
| rtstartup | ||
| rustc-std-workspace-alloc | ||
| rustc-std-workspace-core | ||
| rustc-std-workspace-std | ||
| std | ||
| stdarch@d215afe9d1 | ||
| test | ||
| unwind | ||